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OKLAHOMA'S SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND:
A FUND WITHOUT A FUNCTION?
I. INTRODUCMION
Many people have never heard of special indemnity funds,' un-
less they are involved with workers' compensation law,2 or keep up
with political scandals. Special indemnity funds were, as recently as
1991, found in every state3 as well as in the federal arena.4  These
funds, sometimes referred to as second 5 or subsequent injury funds, 6
are still found in a majority of states. Created under the appropriate
workers' compensation statutes, the funds are generally created to en-
courage the hiring of disabled or handicapped workers. The basic
premise is that employers are less likely to hire workers who already
have a disability. Employers may fear that if the worker later be-
comes injured on the job, the employer could then be held liable for
the total sum of the disability, rather than just the disability caused by
1. H. Alston Johnson, Workers' Compensation, 53 LA. L. REv. 1029,1033 (1993) (referring
to the Second Injury Fund as the "little-known portion of the Act").
2. See Carol Griffee, Wounded Workers' Comp, ARx. Bus., May 13, 1991, at 12. Even
articles written specifically for employers concerned with workers' compensation have noted,
"[t]here's also something called the Second Injury Fund, which nobody professes to be able to
explain easily." Id.
3. Keith N. Hylton & Steven E. Laymon, The Internalization Paradox and Workers' Com-
pensation, 21 HosTRA L. REv. 109, 166 (1992); JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRAcincs § 4595 (1979); 82 AM. Ju. 2D Workers' Compensation § 61 (1992). However, some
states do not have these provisions. For example, Colorado had a subsequent injury fund for
more than 40 years, before closing that fund against injuries occurring after July 1, 1993, and
against occupational diseases occurring after April 1, 1994. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-46-104
(1993). When all payments have been made out of this fund, the remaining balance will revert to
the general fund of the state, and the subsequent injury fund will cease to exist. Id.
4. Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988).
5. ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.040 (1994); Amx. CODE ANN. § 11-9-525 (Michie 1993); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-349 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-3-13 (Bums 1994); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 85.55 (West 1993).
6. COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-46-101 (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-360 (1994).
7. W. ANN. LAB. CODE § 4750 (1994); Dow Chemical Co. v. Workmens' Compensation
Appeals Bd., 432 P.2d 365,372 (Cal. 1967); Leiker v. Manor House, Inc., 457 P.2d 107, 108 (Kan.
1969); 82 AM. JuR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 61 (Supp. 1994) (citing Beale v. Shepherd, 809
S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1991)); cf. Larry Williams, High Cost of Covering Injury Claims Comes As A
Shock, HARFOa CouRAr, June 25, 1994, at C1 (discussing Connecticut's second injury fund,
which was created as a "means to encourage employers to hire wounded World War II veter-
ans"); Don't Be Fooled By New G.L Bi/4 ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATCH, Oct. 2,1992, at 2C. (discuss-
ing Missouri's second injury fund, which was intended to encourage the hiring of injured World
War II veterans).
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the on-the-job accident.' For example, an employee who is blind in
one eye could be considered to be permanently partially disabled.
However, if that employee subsequently loses his or her other eye in
an injury on the job, the employee would then be 100% permanently
totally disabled. Without a second injury fund, the employer would be
liable for the 100% disability, even though without the pre-existing
injury, the accident would only have resulted in a permanent partial
disability. 9 With a second injury fund, the employer is only liable for
the harm caused while on the job.10 The second injury fund steps in to
alleviate the employer from providing compensation for the resulting
increased disability from the combination of the two injuries."
While the purpose of second injury funds is not to provide bene-
fits for hiring the disabled, they do provide an incentive by removing
the potential financial disadvantages of hiring a disabled employee.
This places the disabled worker on the same ground as the non-dis-
abled worker since the employer is now not as likely to be deterred
from hiring or retaining the worker by the possible high compensation
costs.'2  Thus, instead of one employer paying the price for hiring a
handicapped employee, the risk of injuries is spread out across all em-
ployers.' 3  While once called "Employers' Compensation Acts,"' 4
these funds are generally held to be for the benefit of the workers.' 5
Oklahoma courts have consistently found that the purpose of the
Oklahoma Special Indemnity Fund (the "SPIF") is to encourage the
8. Special Indem. Fund v. Figgins, 831 P.2d 1379, 1381 (Okla. 1992).
9. Nease v. Hughes Stone Co., 244 P. 778, 780 (Okla. 1925). This was a case prior to the
enactment of the Special Indemnity Fund Act where a person was hired with only the use of one
eye. Id. at 778. He then suffered the loss of the second eye on the job and the court found that
the employer was liable for the total amount of the resulting disability. Id. at 781; see also 2
ARTHUR LARSON, THm LAW OF WORKMENS' COMPENSATION §§ 59.31(a), 10-492.397 (1992)
(noting that within 30 days of the decision in Nease, seven to eight thousand disabled workers
were displaced in Oklahoma).
10. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Watts, 293 A.2d 836, 838 (Md. 1972).
11. Hugh O'Boyle, Handling Your First Workers Compensation Case: Defending The Car-
rier Or Employer, in LITIoATION AND ADMINISTRATION PRACrcE COURSE HANDBOOK 1, 7
(1993).
12. 33 U.S.C. § 908(t) (1988); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 868 F.2d 759 (Cal. 1989); 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 61
(1992) (quoting Kidder v. Coastal Constr. Co., 342 A.2d 729 (Me. 1975 )).
13. Larry Williams, Troubled State Fund Survives; Legislative Panel Tables Move To Abolish
Second Injury Fund, THm HARTFoRD COtRANT, March 1, 1994, at B9.
14. See Hernandez v. Gerber Group, 608 A.2d 87 (Conn. 1992). As late as 1992, courts
found that the purpose of Connecticut's Second Injury and Compensation Assurance Fund was
"to relieve employers from having to bear costs of pre-existing medical conditions." Id. at 91.
15. Graham v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 49 (D. Miss. 1966) (finding work-
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hiring of the handicapped worker, 6 but the reality is that Oklahoma's
version of a second injury fund does very little to promote this pur-
pose. The provisions of the SPIF legislation, restrictive when com-
pared to most other state and federal acts," have entirely defeated the
purpose of encouraging the hiring of handicapped workers. The
SPIF's onerous restrictive definition of the term "previously impaired
person" results in no protection for the many seriously impaired
workers from the very statute that purports to protect them.'8 While
the original SPIF legislation was quite liberal,' 9 the recent changes in
the SPIF statutes, which limit disabilities and increase the amounts of
compensable impairment, and the interpretations of those statutes by
the courts, have combined to make the SPIF impotent to fulfill its
purpose of promoting the hiring of handicapped workers in
Oklahoma.
In this comment the author will discuss the common provisions
and characteristics of second injury fund statutes and analyze the past
and current state of the SPIF. This comment will show how the en-
abling statutes have failed to allow the SPIF to meet its stated purpose
of encouraging the hiring of handicapped workers. Additionally, this
comment will illustrate how the indebted SPIF is now obsolete due to
the Americans With Disabilities Act (the "ADA") and will contend
that the best course of reform is for the Oklahoma legislature to re-
peal the SPIF in Oklahoma.
16. See, e.g., Special Indem. Fund v. Figgins, 831 P.2d 1379, 1381 (Okla. 1992); Special In-
dem. Fund v. Treadwell, 693 P.2d 608, 610 (Okla. 1984); Special Indem. Fund v. Scott 652 P.2d
278, 280 (Okla. 1982) (holding that the SPIF was created to remove barriers to employment of
the disabled and handicapped, as well as to assure employers that they will not be responsible for
prior disabilities); Special Indem. Fund v. Wade, 189 P.2d 609, 610 (Okla. 1948).
17. However, it is not as restrictive as Kansas and Colorado, which have abolished their
second injury funds. See COLO. Rnv. STAT. § 8-46-101 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-567 (1993).
18. Special Indem. Fund v. Bedford, 852 P.2d 150 (Okla. 1993) (holding that being adjudi-
cated as permanently partially disabled in another state is insufficient to qualify the employee as
a previously impaired person); Special Indem. Fund v. Figgins, 831 P.2d 1379 (holding that im-
pairment to the lungs and respiratory system did not qualify the employee as a previously im-
paired person); Special Indem. Fund v. Schultz, 831 P.2d 1385 (Okla. 1992) (holding that
removal of a colon and rectum did not qualify employee as a previously impaired person); Bar-
clay v. Special Indem. Fund, 864 P.2d 851 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993) (holding a shoulder injury was
inadequate to qualify the employee as a previously impaired person); Hart v. Special Indem.
Fund, 867 P.2d 1351 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that complete binaural hearing loss is not
sufficient to make an employee a previously impaired person).
19. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 171 (Supp. 1994).
1995]
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II. STANDARD SPECIAL INDEMNITY FuND PROVISIONS
Second injury funds are creatures of statute and only have those
powers which the legislature gives them.20 However, most funds oper-
ate with the general purpose of placing the disabled worker on an
even footing with the average worker. The basic criteria for determin-
ing liability of a fund is whether a successive injury, added to a prior
disability, has combined to produce a disability which is greater than
the total of the separate factors combined.2 ' Beyond that criteria, dif-
ferent states have used assorted statutory restrictions to ensure that
only those who truly have a pre-existing disability are eligible to re-
ceive compensation from the second injury fund.2 These safeguards
can be divided into several different categories for the purpose of dis-
cussion: notice of impairment requirements; limitations on types of
impairment eligible; and limitations on amounts of impairment
eligible.
A. Notice of Impairment Requirements
Most states require that the employee notify the employer of the
pre-existing disability at or before the time of hiring.2 3 The purpose of
this requirement goes directly to the goal of the fund. If the employer
did not know of an employee's pre-existing disability at the time of
hiring, then the employer could not have discriminated against that
handicap. Thus, the disabled worker would already be on the same
footing as the unhandicapped worker, so there would be no need to
use the fund to encourage the hiring of that worker as he or she is not
being discriminated against. Therefore, in many states with this re-
quirement, if the employer can't show that he or she had notice prior
to hiring, then the second injury fund is not liable for any part of the
injury.24 While this provision appears to penalize the employer for an
employee's nondisclosure, it is necessary for the purpose of the fund
20. See Subsequent Injury Fund v. Pack, 242 A.2d 506 (Md. 1968).
21. See CoNr. Gm. STAT. § 31-349(a) (1993).
22. Alaska's statutes contain both a listing of impairments as well as a prior written notice
requirement. ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.205 (1994).
23. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4595; GA. CODE ANN. § 114-914 (1977); Aiuz. REv. STAT.
ANNm. § 23-1065(c)(2) (1993) (requiring the employer to establish by written records that the
employer had knowledge of the permanent impairment at the time the employee was hired, or
that employee was kept in employ after such knowledge was acquired by the employer).
24. Claphan v. Great Bend Manor, 611 P.2d 180, 184 (Kan. 1980); see also Morgan v. Inter-
Collegiate Press, 606 P.2d 479 (Kan. 1980).
[Vol. 30:745
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to be met. Most federal circuits, when interpreting the federal Long-
shore and Harbor Workers' Act's second injury fund provision25 also
require that the employee's pre-existing condition be "manifest to the
employer at the time that the employee is hired to enable recovery
from the second injury fund .... ,26 Additionally, some states require
the filing of notice of the pre-existing impairment with the state.27 If a
filing is not made, the later injury is not eligible for compensation
from the fund.28
Other states modify the notice provisions to only require the em-
ployer to know of the pre-existing disability before the subsequent
injury.29 While this goes less to the original purpose of the fund of
encouraging the hiring of the physically impaired, it does put the em-
ployer on notice that an employee is disabled. The benefit to the em-
ployee of this type of requirement is that if he or she becomes
disabled after being hired by some other cause, the employer has an
incentive to keep that employee, rather than firing that employee to
reduce potential future liability costs.3" Thus, the goal of placing the
disabled worker on the same ground as the average worker is met, as
the employer has no more reason to fire the disabled worker than the
non-disabled worker.
The Oklahoma SPIF statutes do not fall into either of these two
categories. Instead, Oklahoma joins several other states31 where there
is no notice requirement to the employer whatsoever.32 Rather, an
employee simply must be a 'physically impaired person' at the time of
the on-the-job accident. 33 Not only is no notice to the employer re-
quired, but the only notice ever required is to the SPIF by the filing of
25. Jacksonville Shipyards v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 851
F.2d 1314, 1316 (11th Cir. 1988); Eymard & Sons Shipyard v. Smith, 862 F.2d 1220,1222 (5th Cir.
1988).
26. APPI mAN, supra note 3, § 4595. But see America Ship Bldg. Co. v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, 865 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that there is no require-
ment under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act that the employer have
knowledge of the pre-existing condition, as long as evidence is provided that the condition was
manifest to someone prior to the subsequent injury).
27. See APPLBmAN, supra note 3, § 4595; ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.205(c) (1994); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-567 (1993).
28. Leiker v. Manor House, Inc., 457 P.2d 107, 112 (Kan. 1969); Piper v. Kansas 'urnpike
Auth., 436 P.2d 396, 401-02 (Kan. 1968).
29. Bellucci v. Tip Top Farms, Inc., 248 N.E.2d 864, 865 (N.Y. 1969).
30. Grieco v. Grieco Elec. Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
31. O'Boyle, supra note 11, at 7 ("Since 07-27-87, the employer need not even have known
of the impairment.").
32. O'Boyle, supra note 11, at 7.
33. OKLA. STAT. tit 85, § 172(d) (Supp. 1994).
1995]
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the appropriate Form 3-F by the employee.34 Often, the employee
will not even be aware of the potential SPIF benefits unless his or her
attorney inquires about pre-existing injuries. Thus, the SPIF benefits
have been referred to as "the icing on the cupcake or an afterthought
for the injured worker,"35 since the worker may not realize that he or
she is even eligible for compensation from this fund until he or she is
mid-way through the adjudication of the job-related injury.
By omitting an employer notice requirement, the SPIF has made
it impossible to meet the oft-stated purpose of encouraging the em-
ployment of handicapped workers. 6 Since the employer may not
know of a pre-existing handicap, there is no encouragement for em-
ployment. Thus the original stated purpose of the SPIF is frustrated
by the very statutes which create the fund.
B. Types of Impairment Requirements
In addition to the notice of impairment requirements, some states
place limitations on the type of impairments that are allowed to be
combined with the adjudicated injury against the SPIF.37 Generally,
all states require that the impairment be of a permanent nature.38
Some states go so far as to take statutory notice of conditions which
are presumed to be permanent, no longer burdening the employee
with the need to prove the permanence of that condition39 Other
states may list the types of pre-existing physical impairments, which if
not industrial-related, are still compensable if they equal or exceed a
34. See Sidney A. Musser, Jr. et al., Special Indemnity Fund, in ADVANCED WORKERS'
COMPENSATION IN OKLA-omA, BEYOND THE BASICS § II, at 197 (1990). "The full significance
of filing the rather new Form 3-F, Employees Claim for Benefits From the Special Indemnity
Fund, has yet to be determined .... Some concern has been expressed that this may be deemed
the necessary pleading to file to commence a claim against the Special Indemnity Fund or to toll
the statute of limitations." Id. at 197-98.
35. Id. at 195.
36. See Strong v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 490 S.W.2d 162 (Tenn. 1973) (holding that an
employer must either have notice of the employee's disability when he or she is hired or the
employee must have continued working for the employer after disclosure of the disability to
engage the second injury fund).
37. See Appalachian Regional Hosps., Inc. v. Brown, 463 S.W.2d 323,326 (Ky. 1971) (hold-
ing that spondylolisthesis is a congenital condition and not a pre-existing disease); Young v.
Long, 463 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Ky. 1971) (holding that an aging condition such as a degenerative
disc is not a pre-existing disease condition); Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 607 F.2d 1378, 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that self-in-
flicted suicide is compensable where a pre-existing mental disorder was aggravated by conditions
of employment).
38. Mayer v. Harmony Country Club, 333 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (1972); Strong, 490 S.W.2d at
163; Bezgenbluk v. Home Window Bldg. 274 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1966).
39. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-400 (Law. Co-op. 1993).
[Vol. 30:745
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designated percentage of permanent impairment evaluation under the
American Medical Association Guides.n°
Oklahoma places several restrictions on the types of pre-existing
impairments that are eligible for compensation from the SPIE.
Oklahoma requires that the permanent pre-existing disability be of a
type that is combinable with the subsequent injury.41 To be combina-
ble under existing statutes, the injury must be from the loss of sight in
one eye, or the loss by amputation of the whole or part of a member
of his or her body.42 A "member" is judicially defined in Oklahoma
as hands, arms, thumbs, fingers, toes, legs, or feet.43 The eyes are no
longer included in that definition, as the loss of sight is clearly stated
in the statute.44
If the member is not amputated, but only suffering from a partial
impairment of use, then that loss of use must be "obvious and appar-
ent from observation or examination by an ordinary layman, that is, a
person who is not skilled in the medical profession .... ,45 This is
accomplished in court by the use of a witness or family member who
will testify that the claimant's injury is obvious and apparent to him or
her.46 Oklahoma is the only state with such a requirement An ad-
ditional type of pre-existing impairment which is eligible to combine is
"any pre-existing disability adjudged and determined by the Workers'
Compensation Court... ."4 Thus, an injury to the back, not a judi-
cially defined member, is eligible to combine with a later work-related
injury if the back injury also happened at work and was adjudicated.
However, Oklahoma courts will not recognize a pre-existing disability
40. ARu REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1065(C)(3) (1993).
41. Musser et al., supra note 34, at 196.
42. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 171 (Supp. 1994).
43. Special Indem. Fund v. Figgins, 831 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Okla. 1992). This case interprets
the term "major member" as hands, arms, feet and legs as a result of an earlier interpretation of
the term "member" made when section 171 only mentioned "specific members." Id. at 1384.
That section was narrowed to "major members" in the 1986 amendment. Id Later, however,
the language of the statute changed back to "members" in the 1993 amendment. See OKLA.
STAT. tit. 65, § 171 (Supp. 1994). "Member" was also defined in this case as hands, arm, fingers,
thumbs, legs, feet and toes. Figgins, 831 P.2d at 1384.
44. Figgins, 831 P.2d at 1384.
45. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 171 (Supp. 1994).
46. Musser et al., supra note 34, at 196. While the common procedure is to take the spouse,
parent or significant other to testify as to the obvious and apparent nature of the disability,
injuries such as amputations and surgical scarring will probably be the subject of judicial notice,
and this testimony will not be needed. Musser et al., supra note 34, at 196.
47. John F. Bates, Second Injury Liability and the Application of the Special Indemnity
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which was adjudicated by an out-of-state workers' compensation
court .4 9
As a result of these restrictions, many individuals who may be
totally incapable or extremely limited in their ability to work due to
their handicaps are not considered to have a pre-existing disability in
Oklahoma. Any injury to the head, except for the eyes,50 is not suffi-
cient for a pre-existing disability. Mental retardation is not considered
a pre-existing disability. Deafness is not considered a pre-existing dis-
ability. 1 A brain tumor, or cancer 2 of the head or body also will not
qualify. Likewise, an injury to the torso,53 no matter how severe, will
not qualify. These non-qualifying afflictions also include severe
asthma,54 spinal injuries,55 removal of the colon and rectum,56 diabe-
tes,57 lung disease, 5  heart disease,59 hernias60 or kidney failure.61 If
these disabilities did not have the "good fortune" to occur at work,
and thus be previously adjudicated by the courts, then they are not
considered by Oklahoma's SPIF to be a pre-existing disability.
As an example of the absurdity resulting from this legislation,
ponder a hypothetical. A person who walks with a slight, yet obvious
49. See Special Indem. Fund v. Bedford, 852 P.2d 150 (Okla. 1993) (holding that a worker
who has received an out-of-state award for a permanent disability does not qualify as a previ-
ously impaired person in Oklahoma).
50. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 171 (Supp. 1994).
51. Hart v. Special Indem. Fund, 867 P.2d 1351, 1352 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993). Despite em-
ployee Hart being completely deaf as a result of a birth defect and suffering an obvious and
apparent speech impediment from that congenital deafness, the court found that Hart was not a
physically impaired person. Id.
52. See Special Indem. Fund v. Schultz, 831 P.2d 1385 (Okla. 1992).
53. See Barclay v. Special Indem. Fund, 864 P.2d 851 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993). A shoulder
injury is not sufficient to qualify for a combinable pre-existing disability against the Special In-
demnity Fund. Id. at 853.
54. Figgins v. Special Indem. Fund, 831 P.2d 1379 (Okla. 1992).
55. Cf. Special Indem. Fund v. Acuff, 383 P.2d 630 (Okla. 1963) (holding that where the
unadjudicated pathology of the spine permanently affected a specific member of the body, such
as through radiculopathy into the hips and legs, then the disability could be combined with the
last injury into making an award against the Special Indemnity Fund).
56. Schultz, 831 P.2d at 1387-88. Despite her cancer-related removal of her colon and rec-
tum, followed by a job-related hand injury resulting in 20% disability to her hand, the court
found Schultz was not a previously physically impaired person pursuant to OK.A. STAT. tit. 85,
§ 171 (1988). Schultz, 831 P.2d at 1387-88. The court further noted that section 171 uses the
word amputation in conjunction with the term major member. Id. However, while Schultz's
colon and rectum were surgically removed, the court did not consider that to be an amputation.
Ild. at 1388.
57. Musser et al., supra note 34, at 196.
58. Figgins, 831 P.2d at 1384.
59. Ild.
60. Musser et al., supra note 34, at 196.
61. Figgins, 831 P.2d at 1385.
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and apparent, limp later loses a hand in a machine at work. This per-
son will be considered to have a pre-existing disability. Thus, he or
she may be eligible for benefits from the SPIF. However, if that
worker did not have a slight limp, but instead suffered from complete
and total deafness when the hand was amputated, he or she would not
be eligible for consideration by the SPIF. This would mean that the
state considers a one-handed person with a limp to be more disabled
than a one-handed, totally deaf individual who has also lost the ability
to communicate through sign language. The courts and the legislature
have ignored this incongruous result. The fund administrators and the
legislature are more concerned with reducing moneys paid out,62
while the courts are limited to statutory interpretation, despite the un-
fair results.63
C. Amount of Impairment Requirements
Another requirement found in many jurisdictions is a threshold
amount of disability which must be achieved by the combination of
the pre-existing disability with the subsequent adjudicated injury. In
most states, the basic criteria for compensation from the second injury
fund is that the pre-existing disability and the subsequent injury must
combine to create more disability than the two injuries separately.64
Some states originally required that the resulting combination of the
disabilities must create a total permanent disability.65 This appears to
rarely be the case today. Instead, many states set a limit where the
pre-existing injury must be such that if it were a work-related injury it
would result in a certain designated number of weeks of compensation
payments,66  or a certain designated percentage of permanent
impairment. 67
62. Patricia Bond, Regional News, UNrrED PREss INT''L, Jan. 13, 1988. Two years after the
1986 amendments made the SPIF requirements the most restrictive ever in Oklahoma, Michael
Clingman, then-administrator of the SPIF, complained that the fund was too liberal and needed
more restrictions. Id.
63. Figgins, 831 P.2d at 1384. The court attempted to resolve the incongruous results by
deciding that the SPIF was meant "to reduce, not to eliminate the number of physically handi-
capped persons who employers might hesitate to hire because of possible liability for impairment
beyond that suffered in an on-the-job injury." Id.
64. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4595; Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-525 (Michie 1987); CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-349 (West Supp. 1994).
65. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4595; Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd. v. H&M Log-
ging Co., 492 P.2d 98 (Alaska 1971).
66. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.59 (West 1988).
67. See Axuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1065 (Supp. 1994) (requiring that the pre-existing im-
pairment must equal or exceed a ten percent permanent impairment when evaluated in accord-
ance with the AMA Guides).
1995)
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Some states have no specific limitations on the amount of impair-
ment required. They only dictate that the pre-existing condition, in
combination with the subsequent injury, causes a greater disability or
loss of earnings than would have resulted from the second injury
alone. 68 Other states only vaguely require that the pre-existing injury
be serious enough to constitute a "hindrance or obstacle to obtaining
reemployment if the employee becomes unemployed," as well as meet
a pre-determined number of weeks of disability requirement.69
In Oklahoma, after an injured worker meets the first two SPIF
requirements-having a pre-existing, combinable physical impair-
ment, and a subsequent on-the-job injury7T-he or she still must meet
the hurdle of being able to combine the resulting impairment from the
injuries into a total amount of disability equal to a 40% material in-
crease of disability to the body.71 This is a drastic change from the
prior requirement of a 17% material increase which was required until
Sept. 1, 1992.72 Some attorneys have argued that this recent increase
is too restrictive and arbitrary.73 Regardless, many have found it diffi-
cult to meet.
III. HISTORY OF THE FuND
A. The Oklahoma Workers' Compensation System Before the Fund
Workers' compensation statutes were first established in Ger-
many in 1882, followed shortly thereafter in England.74 They were
later established in the United States by Maryland in 1902 and the
Federal Employee's Liability Act of 1906.75 By 1911 twelve states had
adopted workers' compensation statutes.76 Oklahoma adopted its
Workers' Compensation Act to take effect July 1, 1915.77 Although
68. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-37-4 (Supp. 1994).
69. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.220 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
70. Musser et al., supra note 34, at 195-96.
71. OK A. STAT. tit. 85, § 172 (Supp. 1994).
72. Id.
73. Robby Trammell et al., Workers Comp Fund $16.2 Million in Red, THE SUNDAY
OKAHoMAN, Nov. 20, 1994, at 24A. Oklahoma workers' compensation attorney Richard Bell
said he anticipates that the increase in disability will be challenged in court for being arbitrary
and capricious. Id. This argument is based on the many workers who have paid into the fund
from their awards while the percentage was set at 17% material increase. Id. If these workers
are now injured, even if they meet the 17% material increase, their claims would be denied. Id.
74. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4591.
75. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4591. Both of these enactments were bitterly disputed and
later declared unconstitutional, but a later enactment of the Federal Act was approved in 1908
and found to be constitutional. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4591.
76. APrrLMA, supra note 3, § 4591.
77. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 1 (1991).
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threatened with numerous challenges as to the constitutionality and
appropriateness of the statute, the act survived all attempts to have it
withdrawn.78 From 1915 to 1943, the Compensation Act operated
without a special indemnity fund.
Second Injury Funds gained popularity in the early 1900s. New
York adopted one of the first, to be followed shortly thereafter by the
Federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act in 1927.
79
Some Second Injury Funds were adopted following World War II to
encourage the employment of injured war veterans.8" Before
Oklahoma adopted a special indemnity fund law, there was no appor-
tionment for pre-existing disabilities. Thus, employers or insurance
carriers were liable for all of the disability when a previously impaired
worker was injured on the job.81 This created reluctance from em-
ployers in hiring obviously previously impaired workers.82 Tragedies
resulted, such as when the Oklahoma Supreme Court announced the
decision against apportioning injuries in Nease v. Hughes Stone Co.83
Within thirty days after the court ruled that the employer was liable
for the totality of a disability, and not just the amount of disability
caused by the employer, "[b]etween seven and eight thousand one-
eyed, one-legged, one-armed and one-handed workers were displaced
in Oklahoma." 84 The SPIF attempted to remedy this by allowing ap-
portionment of the pre-existing disability by the fund. Thus, the fear
of compensation costs which drove the employers to displace the
handicapped workers was alleviated.
B. The Original Purpose and Enactment of the Fund
The Special Indemnity Fund Act was enacted in Oklahoma in
1943 as House Bill No. 249.85 The Act is located in Title 85 Sections
171-176 of the Oklahoma Statutes.86 Prior to the creation of the SPIF,
78. See Tom Dolan Heating Co. v. Feverston, 73 P.2d 115 (Okla. 1937); Home Indem. Co. v.
Coin, 61 P.2d 1067 (Okla. 1936); Fox v. Dunning, 255 P. 582 (Okla. 1927); New Amsterdam
Casualty Co. v. Rinehart & Donovan Co., 255 P. 587 (Okla. 1927).
79. Stuart Housel Smith, The Special Fund Under The Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 11 MAR. L. 71, 72 (1987).
80. See sources cited supra note 7.
81. Special Indem. Fund v. Figgins, 831 P.2d 1379, 1381 (Okla. 1992).
82. ELmER H. BLAm, REFERENCE GUImE TO WoRamENs' COMPENSATION § 11:14 (1973).
83. 224 P. 778 (Okla. 1925).
84. 2 LARsoN, supra note 9, § 59.31(a).
85. Figgins, 831 P.2d at 1380 (citing Grammer v. State Indus. Court, 435 P.2d 101, 103
(Okla. 1967)); George E. Fisher, Practice Before The State Industrial Commission, 7 OKLA. L
REV. 189, 195 (1954).
86. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, §§ 171-76 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
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disabled workers often found it difficult to obtain employment.87 "In
an attempt therefore, to make it easier for handicapped, disabled, or
previously injured people to obtain jobs or for those who sustained
injuries to keep their jobs, the Second Injury Fund was created. 8 8
While the SPIF's statutory language did not define the purpose of
the fund, numerous court cases have attempted to do so. Across the
country, the funds are generally created to encourage the hiring of
disabled or handicapped workers.8 9 Likewise, in Oklahoma, the
courts have consistently found that the purpose of the SPIF is to "en-
courage employment of previously impaired workers by assuring em-
ployers that they will only be responsible for compensation payments
stemming from a subsequent injury as though the worker were not
previously impaired."90 In order to meet the purpose of placing hand-
icapped workers on the same footing as the average worker, the SPIF
had to reassure employers that they would not be liable for disabilities
which do not result from their employment. Thus, some cases have
found that the purpose of the SPIF is to compensate employers.91
However, this is analogous to saying that the purpose of putting bait
on a fish hook is to feed the fish. Putting the bait on the hook is
necessary to attract the fish. Similarly, compensating the employers is
necessary for them to find hiring handicapped employees attractive.
C. Recent Changes in the Special Indemnity Fund
In 1986, section 171 was amended so that it closely resembles its
present day form.92 The reference to "any part of the body" was
87. Figgins, 831 P.2d at 1381.
88. Musser et al., supra note 34, at 195.
89. See sources cited supra note 7.
90. Special Indem. Fund v. Bedford, 852 P.2d 150, 154 (Okla. 1993); Figgins, 831 P.2d at
1382; Special Indem. Fund v. Treadwell, 693 P.2d 608 (Okla. 1984); Special Indem. Fund v. Scott,
652 P.2d 278 (Okla. 1982).
91. Petroleum Maintenance Co. v. Herron, 206 P.2d 182, 184 (Okla. 1949).
92. Figgins, 831 P.2d at 1383.
The original SPIF legislation required that in order to receive compensation from the fund,
the employee must be deemed a "previously impaired person." A previously impaired person
was one whom suffered from "the loss of one eye, the loss by amputation of the whole, or a part
of some member of his body, or the loss of the use, or partial loss of the use, of a specific
member." OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 171 (1943). No percentage of combinable disability was re-
quired by this statute. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 172 (1943). In 1975, section 171 was revised. This
amendment defined a physically impaired person as "a person who has sustained an injury to
any part of the body or a specific member thereof." OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 171 (1975). As a
result of this amendment, the period from 1975 until 1986 was the most liberal period for claims
against the SPIF. There was no threshold percentage requirement, and a far larger number of
injuries were eligible for compensation.
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deleted.93 Additionally, the language of "specific member" was
removed and the term "major member" was substituted in its place.94
Major member, while not defined by statute, was defined by the judi-
ciary in Special Indemnity Fund v. Figgins.95 Thus, the SPIF narrowed
from allowing unadjudicated, pre-existing disability to any part of the
body, to allowing it only to the eyes, arms, hands, legs, and feet. Ad-
ditionally, the SPIF was further restricted by a requirement that the
combination of the two injuries had to result in a seventeen percent
material increase.96
While the application of the SPIF was narrowed by the 1986
amendments, it wasn't until 1992 that the full impact of the statute was
felt. In Figgins, a worker with a pre-existing disability of asthma was
awarded benefits from the SPIF by the Workers' Compensation
Court. The SPIF appealed to the three-judge panel of the Workers'
Compensation Court which affirmed the award to Figgins. The SPIF
appealed again to the Court of Appeals which also affirmed. The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma granted certiorari and overturned the
decision on the grounds that an injury to the body does not qualify
under the major member meaning of section 171.97
Despite the increased restrictions on the SPIF, by 1988, the fund
was deep in financial trouble.98 Michael Clingman, administrator of
the SPIF in 1988, blamed the financial difficulties on tort reform, lib-
eralization of the SPIF, and additional financial responsibilities of the
State Insurance Fund and Workers' Compensation Administration
Fund which had previously supplemented the SPIF.99 More legisla-
tive changes were not far away. In 1992, the SPIF increased the taxes
levied upon the judgments, with the worker and the employer or in-
surance carrier each paying five percent of the judgment, up from
three percent previously. 100 These 1992 changes were attributed to
the SPIF's financial difficulty. 101 While many funds are funded by
93. Figgins, 831 P.2d at 1383.
94. Id.
95. Id. "Under prior case law, this Court used the term 'major member' to identify the
arms, hands, legs, feet, and eyes. Because Sec. 171 specifically includes the loss of sight in its
definition of a physically impaired person, it is no longer necessary to include the eyes within the
more general term 'major member."' Id. at 1384.
96. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 172 (1991).
97. Figgins, 831 P.2d at 1380.
98. Patricia Bond, Regional News, UMnE PRESS INT'L, Jan. 13, 1988.
99. Id.
100. OiKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 173 (Supp. 1994).
101. Trammell et al., supra note 73, at 24A.
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unclaimed death benefits and employer contributions, few states actu-
ally have the injured employees contribute money to the fund from
their injury awards. While employers and insurance carriers benefit
from contributing to the fund, as they are then indemnified against
liability for future injuries, it is difficulty to ascertain what benefit
there is for the employee. A worker could contribute five percent of
his or her injury award to the SPIF, and then never have another in-
jury. That money is gone from that individual worker for eternity.
This creates a basic fairness question of whether the employees should
pay to indemnify the employers, or whether the employers should
bear the sole cost.
Michael Clingman advocated making the SPIF's benefits even
more restrictive than their already narrow construction. "They've lib-
eralized the use of the fund all out of proportion. It was originally
designed to help handicapped workers' get jobs .... It should be more
restrictive."'1 This claim by the SPIF administrator is particularly in-
teresting since the statutes regarding injuries eligible for the SPIF had
become increasingly more and more restrictive, not liberalized. Fi-
nally, Section 171 was modified again in 1993, which removed the
phrase "major member" and substituted simply "member.' 10 3 Now
injuries to the "minor members," such as thumbs, fingers, and toes,
could theoretically be eligible.' 4 However, this is yet to be tested in
an appellate case.
IV. THE CuRRENT STATE OF THE FUND
In fall of 1994, a special session was called to deal with workers'
compensation reform. 5 As a result of House Bill 1002 numerous
workers' compensation statutes were changed.' 6 Section 172 was
amended to add a section "E" which provides that
[a]1 weekly payments for permanent partial disability shall be paid
before any claim for benefits against the Special Indemnity Fund
may be paid. In the case of a lump-sum permanent partial disability
award or settlement, such award or settlement shall be divided by
seventy percent of the employee's weekly wage up to a maximum of
fifty percent of the state's average weekly wage, to determine the
102. Patricia Bond, Regional News, UNrrD PRESS INT'L, Jan. 13, 1988.
103. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 171 (Supp. 1994).
104. See Special Indem. Fund v. Figgins, 831 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Okla. 1992) (citing Special
Indem. Fund v. Davidson, 162 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Okla. 1945)).




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 30 [1994], Iss. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol30/iss4/6
OKLAHOMA'S SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND
number of weeks which must elapse before a claim against the Spe-
cial Indemnity Fund may be paid. °7
Additionally, and perhaps more significant to this discussion, a
new section of the law, Title 85 Section 182,108 was created. This sec-
tion created the "Joint Committee on the Special Indemnity Fund.' 0 9
This committee is charged with conducting a study of the SPIF. Spe-
cifically, the committee is to analyze the impact that closing down the
SPIF would have on the employers of the state.110 This includes de-
termining what impact the ADA has on the SPIE. The committee is
also to determine the unfunded liability of the SPIF as well as analyze
the impact of the growth of the workers' compensation on the SPIF."'
This committee, made up of five state representatives and five state
senators, must file a report of its findings by January 1, 1996 with the
Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate." 2
The significance of this statute is that the legislature appears to be
acknowledging that all is not well with the SPIF. This is clear from a
look at the SPIF today. As of November, 1994, the SPIF was $16.2
million in debt." 3 Workers are waiting at least eighteen months to
receive their SPIF benefits after a favorable adjudication.114 Cur-
rently, more than 3,000 workers are still awaiting the payment of their
awards. 15 Additionally, numerous workers' compensation attorneys
are now filing suits against the SPIF for lump sum interest payments
on the delayed awards. This is in the wake of successful test cases
filed against the SPIF by attorney Richard A. Bell and settled for
$518,551 on behalf of 873 clients." 6 Those test cases are expected to
just be the beginning of employees filing against the SPIF for interest







113. Trammell et al., supra note 73, at IA.
114. Trammell et al., supra note 73, at 1A.
115. Trammell et al., supra note 73, at 24A.
116. Trammell et al., supra note 73, at 24A.
117. Trammell et al., supra note 73, at 24A. "Dozens more lawsuits against the Special In-
demnity Fund are now pending at the comp court, Oklahoma County District Court, Oklahoma
City Federal Court and the state Supreme Court. They involve the interest dispute or other legal
issues that could cause enormous losses to the fund." Trammell et al., supra note 73, at 24A.
The potential for interest payments from lawsuits is $2 million a year if things go poorly for the
SPIF in court. Trammell et al., supra note 73, at 24A.
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to become much more indebted quickly.11 The frustration over the
financial deficits and long delays in paying claimants have caused
comments like that of Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Judge
Noma Gurich. She said, "[t]he Legislature should 'fess up to the fact
that these folks are in the red and they ought to fund it. There ought
to either be a special indemnity fund or there shouldn't."'119
V. THE FuTrui OF THE FuN'Dr-RnE FOR CHANGE
The SPIF is ripe for change. The legislature has acknowledged
that fact by creating a special task force to make recommendations on
changing the SPIF. But Oklahoma is not the only state with difficul-
ties. While some states seem to be managing their second injury funds
quite well, just as many others are in as bad or worse shape as the
Oklahoma SPIF. Additionally, some states are beginning to acknowl-
edge that the ADA may have a significant impact on the operation of
their second injury fund. All of these factors should be taken into
consideration when proposing a reform plan for the SPIF.
A. Other States' Reform
Some states have successfully avoided the long delays that
Oklahoma workers face in receiving their SPIF benefits. Three typical
techniques for ensuring that the employee receives compensation on a
timely basis can be illustrated by the Alaska, Arizona and Kansas stat-
utes. Alaska has opted to have the employer or insurance carrier pay
all of the award of compensation for the combined injury. Then, the
employer is later reimbursed from the Fund.12 This has the effect of
getting compensation to the injured, out of work, individual on a
timely basis. Comparatively, in Oklahoma up to a year and a half will
pass following a successful adjudication against the SPIF before the
injured worker receives compensation. Alaska's provision makes
sense, as the insurance carrier or employer can better withstand a de-
lay in repayment from the SPIF due to their greater resources than
can the individual, injured worker.
118. Trammell et al., supra note 73, at 24A. However, the recent 1994 special session lowered
the rate to seven percent. 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws 1002.
119. Trammell et al., supra note 73, at 24A. Further, Gurich, who has been the comp court's
presiding judge, said the 1994 reforms are not enough. "That's going to make a difference in the
next 10 years but, you know, it's like everything else, it takes a long time for that stuff to start
having an impact .... And, meanwhile, they [the legislature] should have to fund all that deficit
and let them be even." Trammell et al., supra note 73, at 24A.
120. ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.205 (1994).
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Arizona has a similar provision which provides for reimburse-
ment to the employer or insurance carrier on a yearly basis. 12 1 The
employer or carrier must apply to the Fund by November 1, of each
year for reimbursement for any claims paid throughout the year. Re-
imbursements are paid to the employer or carrier before December
31.12 Additionally, this statute has provisions for levying additional
assessments on carriers and employers if the amount of claims is more
than six million per year."
Kansas, like Oklahoma, generally provides for paying the em-
ployee out of the second injury fund." However, Kansas' statutes
also provides that if there were insufficient funds to pay an employee's
award, the fund must notify the employer and have the employer pay
the award.125 The employer would be reimbursed later, when the
fund had collected sufficient monies. 26 Numerous other states follow
these examples which allow the employee, who is injured, to receive
his or her benefits as soon as possible from the employer. 27
There are still states which operate their fund similarly to
Oklahoma's, in that the main incoming funds are a percentage of the
liability of the employer and employee paid into the fund. 28 These
percentages may vary from one to five or more percent, which has
given some of these funds the nicknames of the "one-percenter" or
"two-percenter" funds. 12
9
Other states have additional provisions for putting money into
the fund. Arkansas fines employers who discriminate against employ-
ees who file workers' compensation claims up to $10,000, which is pay-
able directly into the fund.' 30 Colorado also has a provision to put
25% of penalties and fines into the subsequent injury fund.' 3 ' Con-
necticut funnels any collected fines into the second injury fund. 32
Missouri's fund recently acquired a balance of $69 million, the highest
121. ARmZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1065(F) (1994).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-569 (1993).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 31-349(b) (Supp. 1994).
128. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 31-354 (Supp. 1994).
129. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 4595.
130. ARx. CODE ANN. § 11-9-107(a)(1)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993). Additionally, this statute
provides that the payments must be made from the employer itself, and not the insurance car-
rier. Id.
131. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 8-43-304(1) (Supp. 1994).
132. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 31-289 (Supp. 1994).
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in its history, so that the state may forego collecting the taxes for the
fund in 1995.133 Meanwhile, Oklahoma has steadily been taking
money away from the SPIF and channeling it into other departments
like the state Department of Vocational and Technical Education. 134
This diversion of SPIF funds into state agencies is expected to be the
subject of an upcoming lawsuit that claims the diversion of funds is
unconstitutional. 35
Oklahoma is not alone in its financial problems. Other states
have also had significant financial problems with their funds. In Ten-
nessee, the state completely suspended payments from the state's Sec-
ond Injury Fund to both one hundred percent disabled workers as
well as to insurance companies. 36 Meanwhile, Connecticut has seen
its annual costs for the fund escalate from $40 million in 1988-89 to
over $100 million for the 1993 fiscal year.' 37 For Connecticut to pay
on all the claims already filed, without even considering paying any
additional claims after June 30, 1994, the state fund would have to pay
more than $6 billion.13  Minnesota's fund also has its share of
problems with a 1988 unfunded liability of about $1.5 billion.' 39
B. The Impact of the ADA on Second Injury Funds
The ADA was signed into law on July 26, 1990.140 This Act be-
came effective on July 26, 1992, and now Title I of the ADA applies to
133. Terry Ganey, Injury Fund Hits $69 Million; State May Forgo Collecting Taxes To Finance
It, ST. Louis POST-DiSPATcH, Nov. 1, 1994, at 4A. Ironically, the Attorney General of Missouri
credits the health of the fund to "[a]ggressive defense of the Second Injury Fund by state attor-
neys." Id. Thus, in a system where the worker is supposed to receive quick relief, the fund is
being praised for aggressively employing attorneys to fight the injured workers.
134. Trammell et al., supra note 73, at 24A. "But the Legislature also has made changes that
have worsened the shortage. In 1993 Legislators gave 10 percent of the fund to the state Labor
Department, state Department of Vocational and Technical Education and Attorney General's
workers comp fraud unit." Trammell et al., supra note 73, at 24A.
135. Trammell et al., supra note 73, at 24A.
136. Bill Lewis, Insurers Fear State's Second Injury Fund Unable To Refund Claims, NASH-
ViLLE Bus. J., June 27, 1994, at 3.
137. Williams, supra note 7, at C1.
138. Williams, supra note 7, at C1. The $6 billion would compensate for lost wages and
medical bills and would continue to be paid out for approximately the next 50 years. Williams,
supra note 7, at C1.
139. Meg Fletcher, Minnesota Debates Work Comp Cuts, BusINEss INS., April 18, 1988, at
179.
140. Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Employers' Screening Procedures Under The Americans With
Disabilities Act What's Legal? What's Illegal? What's Debatable?, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF
STuDY." CuxrRNT DEVLOPMmENTS IN EMPLOymENT LAw 395 (1994).
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all employers with fifteen or more employees. 41 The ADA generally
extends "to persons with disabilities the same rights afforded to mi-
norities under the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 142 The purpose of the
Act "is no less than to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities. 143 The ADA describes the disabled as an individual
which "(1) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits' 44 one or more of that person's major life activities, 145 (2) has a
record of such an impairment, or (3) is regarded by the covered entity
as having such an impairment. ' 146 Thus the purpose of the ADA is
very similar to the purpose of the SPIE: to prevent discrimination
against handicapped workers.
The ADA is much more liberal in its definition of disability than
the Oklahoma statutes, so that more workers are covered. For exam-
ple, alcoholism, drug addiction, cancer and AIDS may be considered
to be disabling under the ADA. None of these conditions would merit
designation as a pre-existing disability under the SPIF. However,
many conditions which would merit compensation under the regular
parts of the Workers' Compensation Act would not merit a label of
disability under the ADA. "Work-related injuries do not always cause
physical or mental impairments severe enough to 'substantially limit' a
major life activity. Also, many on-the-job-injuries cause non-chronic
impairments which heal within a short period of time with little or no
141. Frank C. Morris, Jr., & Teresa L. Jakubowski, The Americans with Disabilities Act And
Other Health Issues In The Workplace, in ALI-ABA CoURsE OF STUDY: CURRENT DEVELOP-
MENTs IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 345 (1994); Fitzpatrick, supra note 140, at 395. There are four
substantive titles of the ADA: Title I (§§101-108) involves employment discrimination; Title II
prohibits state and local government discrimination; Title III involves access to facilities and
businesses open to the public; and Title IV requires telephone companies to make "non-voice"
services available to the disabled.
142. Morris & Jakubowski, supra note 141, at 343.
143. Morris & Jakubowski, supra note 141, at 343.
144. N. Douglas Grimwood & Denise M. Blommel, Employment Rights of Injured Workers
in Arizona: The Effect of Federal Legislation, 30 ARIZ. ATTY. 16, 17 (1994). "A worker is
'substantially limited' if he is disqualified from either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs as
compared to an average person having comparable training, skills and ability. The inability to
perform a single particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activ-
ity of working." Id.
145. Id. "A 'major life activity' means functions such as caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working. It is important
to note that the physical functions must be examined first to determine if any of them are im-
paired. Only if none of the normal physical functions are impaired does one look to see whether
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long-term or permanent impact."' 47 These types of short-term inju-
ries are not considered disabilities under the ADA.148 For example, if
a worker falls and breaks a leg on the job, it is probably not consid-
ered to be a disability under the ADA, as it will heal relatively quickly
without substantially limiting a life activity. However, if the fracture
takes an abnormally long time to heal, prevents the worker from
walking, or results in a limp, it might qualify the worker as disabled
under the ADA.14 9
The ADA accomplishes the goal of non-discrimination against
the employment of the handicapped by providing that an employer
"may not base an employment decision on the speculation that an ap-
plicant may cause increased workers' compensation costs in the fu-
ture."I50 The ADA has two major impacts on second injury funds.
First, most funds-although not Oklahoma-require that the em-
ployer have notice of the handicap before the employment or hiring of
the worker to be eligible for the later fund benefits.-" The ADA
makes it very difficult to accomplish this requirement. "Pre-employ-
ment questions about disabilities, illness, and past injuries are not al-
lowed if the inquiries have the potential to reveal the existence, nature
or severity of an applicant's disability.' 1 52  The only way that an em-
ployer can ask for the information which is necessary to qualify for
reimbursement from the funds, is by using a medical inquiry after a
"conditional offer of employment.' 1 53 However, the employer is fur-
ther restricted, in that if a medical inquiry is made after a conditional
offer of employment, then the same medical inquiry must be made of
all employees in the same job category. This is regardless of whether
these employees have any disability or perceived disability.' 54 To fail
to test all the employees in the same job category with the same crite-
ria used to test the conditional employee would violate the ADA.'55
However, employers, in states which require the submission of pre-
147. Jeffrey C. Bannon, Application And Enforcement Of The Americans With Disabilities
Act, in 1993 WoRumRs' COMPENSATION INsTrruTE: Tim LAW AND TmE WoRKPLAcE 2 (1993).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1.
150. Id. at 8.
151. 1I
152. Shawn Daughtridge Wallace, The Injured or Disabled Worker: New Rights, New Duties,
6 S.C. L. REv. 23 (1994).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. "The employer must show that the criteria used in determining which conditional
employees are required to undergo a medical examination do not tend to single out individuals
with disabilities." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) (Supp. V 1993)).
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existing disability information to the second injury funds, are allowed
to submit the necessary information due to the later interpretations of
the ADA regulations.'5 6
The second major impact the ADA has on second injury funds is
a result of the purpose of the ADA. Early after its enactment, the
ADA was heralded as an "incredible incentive to return employees to
work after an injury on the job."'5 7 Parallels were soon drawn be-
tween the second injury funds and the ADA. The ADA bans any dis-
crimination against qualified handicapped job applicants. Thus, the
philosophical basis for the second injury funds, encouraging the hiring
of the handicapped, has effectively ceased to exist.' 58 If employers are
already prevented by federal law from discriminating against the hir-
ing of disabled workers, then an additional financial incentive should
not be necessary. States which have abolished' 59 and states which
have considered eliminating 60 their second injury funds often cite the
provisions of the ADA as making the second injury funds purposeless.
Some have found that the second injury funds didn't fulfill their pur-
pose in the first place.
[T]he Second Injury Fund was created to induce employers to hire
or retain injured or disabled workers. But this noble idea has long
since ceased to induce employees to 'do the right thing.' It took the
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) to make employers employ
persons with handicaps. Furthermore, the ADA has made the sec-
ond-injury aspect of the fund almost obsolete. The fund has be-
come an inefficient, multi-million-dollar operation .... 161
156. Id.
157. Colleen Mulcahy, Disability Act Incentive For Worker Return Is Seen, NAT'L UNDER-
WRrUER, PROP. & CASUALTY RISK & BEN. Morcr. EDITION, February 3, 1992, at 9.
158. Id.
159. Carey Gillam, Kansas Insurance Commissioner Wants to Drop Second-Injury Fund,
KANSAS CnTy Bus. J., March 26, 1993, at 3. Assistant Insurance commissioner Dick Brock said,
"the second-injury element of the workers' compensation fund is unnecessary. It's designed to
supplement workers' compensation benefits when a previously injured or disabled worker suf-
fers a second injury on the job .... However the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
designed to protect the disabled from discrimination, lessens the need for the second-injury fund
. ." Id.
160. Lewis, supra note 136, at 3. Tennessee's Commissioner of Finance and Administration
David Manning said, "the Second Injury Fund should be abolished because the Americans with
Disabilities Act accomplishes the same purpose." Lewis, supra note 136, at 3.
161. Matthew Shafner, An Idea Whose 7me Has Come - And Gone?, CoNN. L. TRIBuNE,
April 25, 1994, at 5.
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C. Abolishment of the Fund in Nearby States
Second injury funds have come under increasing attack in the re-
cent years. These funds have been criticized for creating a non-merit
based pool for subsidizing injuries to disabled workers.1 62 Thus, em-
ployers have an incentive to dump claims into the Fund since it will
not effect their premiums. 63 Additionally, the second injury funds
have been accused of being part of the reason for unsafe work-
places.' 4 These funds spread the cost of injuries among all employ-
ers, with no distinctions for workplaces which are safety inspected. 65
Thus, there is no incentive to make the workplaces safe,166 since any
costs an employer with an unsafe workplace will have to bear are
spread out across the industry.167  The only incentive the funds ap-
pear to provide is to reward employers and insurance companies who
are the most aggressive in applying to the fund, not the employers
who have the safest workplace. 68
Another strong criticism of the funds is their cost.169 A staff re-
port in Connecticut has described that state's fund as "an unfunded
insurance plan with runaway costs, few controls, no prospect for a
downward turn in the cost curve and an estimated financial exposure
to the current and future employers of Connecticut that likely reaches
into the billions." 170 Other states, as well as Oklahoma, are also feel-
ing the financial crunch. Unfortunately, Oklahoma's financial difficul-
ties are only expected to get worse. 1
Perhaps the strongest criticism of the second injury funds is that
they are obsolete. The ADA no longer makes it necessary to bribe
employers into hiring and keeping handicapped workers. Employers
cannot discriminate against these workers. With the purpose of the
162. Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers' Compensation And The Persistence Of
Occupational Injuries, 31 Hous. L. REv. 119, 201 (1994).
163. Id. at 202. This created a significant problem in West Virginia where significant dump-
ing occurred due to claims from previous work in hazardous industries like coal mining. Id.
164. Shafner, supra note 161, at 5.
165. Shafner, supra note 161, at 5.
166. Larry Williams, Troubled State Fund Survives; Legislative Panel Tables Move To Abolish
Second Injury Fund, THE HAroRD CouRANT, March 1, 1994, at B9. "While the rest of the
workers' compensation program has been set up to encourage workplace safety . [... t]he Sec-
ond Injury Fund spreads costs without regard to safety record." Id.
167. Shafner, supra note 161, at 5.
168. Williams, supra note 166, at B9.
169. Williams, supra note 166, at B9.
170. Williams, supra note 166, at B9.
171. Trammell et al., supra note 73, at 24A.
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funds better met by a different act, are the funds really necessary any
longer?
Colorado has answered that question with a resounding "no."
There, the legislature has recently abolished its subsequent injury
fund. As of July 1, 1993, no more new cases were accepted by the
Colorado fund.'72 While the employer is not liable for any more in-
jury than the accident at work creates, the employee no longer re-
ceives the additional benefits from the fund. 73 However, in the cases
where the second injury renders the employee permanently and to-
tally disabled, the insurer may seek proportional indemnification from
the previous employer. 174 Opponents of this type of abolishment
would complain that it appears to be punishing the worker by refusing
to compensate the worker for the increased percentage of disability.
However, the purpose of these funds was never to pay the claimants.
The purpose was to put handicapped workers on the same grounds as
the non-handicapped. With that goal accomplished, there is no longer
any reason to bait the hook.
Colorado is not alone in abolishing its second injury fund. Kan-
sas, another nearby state, has also eliminated its fund. The Kansas
Second Injury Fund (the "SIF") was created in 1945 with the one pur-
pose of encouraging "the hiring of handicapped employees by reliev-
ing the employer of the cost of a second injury in certain instances."
"I In 1993, the Kansas legislature tackled the task of workers' com-
pensation reform.17 6 One of the provisions passed eliminated the
SI. 17 7 Assistant Kansas Insurance Commissioner, Dick Brock, called
the SIF unnecessary due to the passage of the ADA.17  The Kansas
SIF will no longer accept claims for injuries which occurred after July
1, 1994.179
172. Ruth A. Brown, Workers' Compensation: State Enactments in 1992, MoNTHMY LAB. R.
50 (1993).
173. CoLo. RFV. STAT. § 8-46-109 (1993).
174. Brown, supra note 172, at 50.
175. David J. Rebein, The Achilles Heel: Employer's Knowledge Of Employee Pre-Existing
Handicaps In Workers' Compensation Cases, 57 KAN. B. Ass'N. 21 (1988).
176. Cynthia Mines, Workers' Compromise" New Legislation Contains Something For Every-
one, WIcHITA Bus. J., May 21, 1993, at 1.
177. Id.
178. Carey Gillan, Kansas Insurance Commissioner Wants To Drop Second-Injury Fund,
KANsAs CrrY Bus. J., March 26, 1993, at 3.
179. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-567 (1993).
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D. Reform Plan for the Fund
The Oklahoma SPIF has been amended numerous times since its
creation in 1943. Each time the restrictions on the amount and type of
disability have changed, at times depending on how badly the SPIF
was in need of finances. Recently, workers' compensation reform cre-
ated a task force to review the SPIF. That task force could try various
types of reform proposals.
The task force could reform the funding for the SPIF. Rather
than bleeding funds off of the SPIF to help finance other departments,
the SPIF could be left intact, with additional help from the general
fund. The task force could also choose from other reforms. It could
alter the type and restrictions on handicaps so that fewer claims are
paid. However, currently the SPIF is at its most restrictive and the
financial problems have not abated. Making the SPIF more restrictive
only serves to eliminate more handicapped people from the fund.
This makes the SPIF even more unable to serve its stated purpose of
encouraging the hiring of handicapped employees.
As a different option, the task force could alter the way claims
are paid to the workers. The task force could consider having the em-
ployer or insurance carrier pay the SPIF claim, and then later reim-
burse the employer. This type of reform has a great deal of potential,
as it gets the money to the injured worker when it is needed, not eight-
een months or more down the line. However, with no other type of
reform accompanying it, this requires insurance carriers to receive
their reimbursements over a year later. The odds of the strong insur-
ance industry allowing a measure like this to pass are unlikely, despite
the fact that it would benefit the workers in Oklahoma.
The real question the task force must address is whether
Oklahoma's SPIF is ripe for reform or repeal. The purpose of the
SPIF, many times reiterated by the courts, is to encourage employers
to hire previously injured workers. A test put to the Missouri legisla-
ture by the St. Louis-Dispatch editorial board is worth considering in
determining the value of the Oklahoma SPIF.8 °
Does the antiquated Second Injury Fund serve its intended purpose
... ? The appropriate inquiry for the legislature is whether the fund
serves that purpose. I suggest the legislature ask those who pur-
portedly benefit from the fund-employees and employers. Do not
involve the rogue attorneys who ride the fund's gravy train. Begin
with two fundamental questions: Has the would-be employee ever
180. Don't Be Fooled by New G.L Bill, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 2, 1992, at 2C.
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notified the employer in advance of the employment decision of a
pre-existing injury? Has the would-be employer ever hired an in-jured worker on the assurance that the fund would minimize its
workers' compensation exposure? If a significant number of em-
ployees and employers answer yes, then.... reform of the Second
Injury Fund is needed. However, if the answer is an overwhelming
no, then the solution is not reform, but repeal. 181
The Oklahoma SPIF would not pass such a test. Oklahoma em-
ployers do not have to be notified of the pre-existing injury, thus it
fails question one. Secondly, the employer only pays for the amount
of injury created by the workplace. The answer to question number
two would also be no. While various types of reform have worked in
other states, most of those states were actually working toward achiev-
ing the purpose of encouraging the hiring of the handicapped.
Oklahoma's SPIF does not encourage the hiring of the handicapped
due to its lack of notice requirement and excessive restrictions. Addi-
tionally, the ADA mandates that employers not discriminate against
the handicapped. In light of these two factors, reform of the SPIF
seems pointless. If it doesn't achieve its purpose of encouraging the
hiring of the handicapped, what purpose does it serve? It does, even-
tually, bring certain injured workers more money. It does, eventually,
generate more fees for attorneys. But neither of these actions are the
purpose of the SPIF. Unless the SPIF can be reformed to meet the
goal of encouraging the hiring of the handicapped, it should be
repealed.
At least two states have eliminated their second injury funds.
Other states have made strong attempts to eliminate them, but have
failed to overcome the strong objections of the insurance industry."
These states all contend that the ADA better meets the purpose of the
Fund.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Special Indemnity Fund in Oklahoma is no longer needed. It
had one purpose, to encourage the hiring of handicapped workers.
That mission statement was never fulfilled by the SPIF as it failed to
require the employer's knowledge of the pre-existing handicap. Addi-
tionally, the severe limitations on the definition of pre-existing disabil-
ity excluded many individuals who should logically be considered
181. Id.
182. See W'lliams, supra note 7, at B9.
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handicapped. Thus, the purpose of the SPIF was never achieved.
More importantly, the recently adopted ADA meets the goal of elimi-
nating discrimination against employing the handicapped, and meets it
more successfully than the SPIF ever did. The SPIF is now an
archaic, purposeless liability to the state of Oklahoma. It is time for
Oklahoma to follow in the steps of other states which have found the
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